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ABSTRACT  
The aim of this paper is to look at the evolution of the main macroeconomic indicators 
during the Covid-19 pandemic in Spain and to compare the main policies implemented 
in different countries in order to discern whether one set of measures has been more 
effective than another. We find a catastrophic trend in indicators in the first half of the 
year due to the restrictive measures, in the second half we find a slight recovery of 
indicators that draws an "asymmetric V" with expectations of full recovery between a time 
frame of 2022 and more than 2025 depending on the scenario considered. No significant 
differences are found between the strategy of implementing restrictive measures and 
that of opting to rely on individual freedoms. The strategy that has delivered the best 
results in economic and health terms has been the strategy of anticipating the crisis. 
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THE SPANISH ECONOMY DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 
AND A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
First of all, this paper gives a chronological review of the most important events of the 
Covid-19 crisis. This will be followed by data from the very first impact of the pandemic 
on the Spanish macro-indicators, followed by a more in-depth analysis of the effects 
throughout the pandemic. The main projections of the Bank of Spain and the IMF are 
mentioned, with short- and long-term views respectively, and then the policies 
implemented in different countries of the Euro zone are mentioned and compared, as 
well as their consequences and effectiveness. Finally, the conclusions and main ideas 
of the paper will be presented. 
Chronology of the Pandemic 
In order to best analyze the macroeconomic effects of SARS-CoV-2 in Spain and other 
European countries throughout the pandemic, we need to contextualize the situation and 
thus understand the origin, development and spread of the virus worldwide. 
A pneumonia broke out in Wuhan, home of 11 million people, of which the Chinese 
authorities notified the World Health Organization (WHO) in December 2019. The 
suspected original outbreak of the virus was in a market in the city, from which 40 people 
were initially infected. 
In early January they listed the newly discovered virus as "2019-nCoV" and later as 
"Sars-Cov-2". The new virus caused coughing, fever, respiratory distress and could lead 
to pneumonia, and the first coronavirus death was a 61-year-old Wuhan resident who 
frequented the city's market and died of severe pneumonia. 
By mid-January 2020, new countries began reporting positive cases within their borders, 
including Thailand and Japan and concern gradually grew. A wise but mistimed policy 
was the decision to quarantine Wuhan, later more cities opted to follow the same policy, 
and by the end of January there were already 36 million people in quarantine and 800 
people infected. On 24th January, 3 positive cases were detected in France. The West 
always maintained a reactive stance on the Covid-19 dilemma, but this event radically 
changed the paradigm of European healthcare and began to worry Western leaders. To 
make matters worse, four active cases were reported in Australia on the same day, the 
virus was no longer encircled in Asia. A few days later, the first infections appeared in 
Germany, a country that is actively collaborating in the research to obtain the vaccine. 
The number of deaths exceeded a hundred and the number of infections was running 
into the thousands, exactly 4,500.  




By the end of February 2020, the coronavirus had spread significantly throughout the 
world and the number of deaths and infections had risen dramatically, to 2,700 and 
80,000 people respectively. The virus reached around 40 countries including the Latin 
American area, where the first cases were beginning to appear. Meanwhile in North 
America, President Trump was making the same mistake as all the other world leaders: 
the unfounded self-confidence that the virus is harmless at their borders because their 
health system is so advanced. What leaders did not know at that time was that no 
national health system was prepared for the magnitude of this historic event.  Corrective 
measures began to be taken with regard to mass events, the "ITB"1 fair in Germany and 
the "Mobile World Congress" in Barcelona were cancelled. 
By 1 March, the death toll had risen to 3,000 dead and 88,000 infected in a total of more 
than 60 different countries. Studies and estimates began to be made on the economic 
impact of the health (and economic) crisis that had developed. The Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimated that world economic 
growth would be +1.5% in the worst-case scenario or +2.4% if the virus was brought 
under control, but still the lowest annual growth in a decade. 
The growth was too high. On 6 March, the 100,000 mark was exceeded with 3,400 
deaths in a total of 90 different countries. As a result of the excessive increase in the 
numbers, with a 13-fold increase in the number of people infected in China and even a 
three-fold increase in the number of people infected in each country, the WHO decided 
to publicly declare a global pandemic on 11 March 2020. 
Restrictive measures soon followed, with Italy, the most affected country after China, 
closing classrooms and imposing quarantine on its entire territory (a total of 60 million 
inhabitants). The United States also cancelled travel by "non-Americans" to the country, 
and in dissonance with Trump's premature predictions, 36 deaths and 1,200 positives 
were counted at its borders, declaring a national emergency, as did the rest of the 
countries. Meanwhile in Spain, the state of emergency was implemented on 14 March, 
with a death toll of 180 and almost 6,000 infected and limiting free movement to 47 million 
people. In the days that followed, the affected countries began to reinforce their borders 
and limit movement within them. 
On 21 March, the highest number of deaths in one day was recorded in Italy: 793 people 
died. The following day, all non-essential economic activity in the country was halted, a 
 
1 Important meeting of the international tourism sector. 




measure that was again copied by other countries in the following days. A few days later, 
the Tokyo Olympics were officially cancelled. 
Preventive measures have not worked and most countries have had to resort to partial 
(or even total) closure of their economies and borders. Against this backdrop, at the end 
of March a new phase was set in motion, with nations beginning to mobilize multi-million-
euro aid packages to keep the national economic structure alive, as in the case of 
Germany, which made available a package of 756 thousand million euros, the largest 
since the Second World War. The United States, in turn, was preparing its own 2-billion-
euro package, while Italy, the country most affected to date, had around 82,400 
confirmed cases. Spain, on the other hand, surpassed China with 85,000 cases a few 
days later, doubling the number of deaths in the Asian country. 
By the beginning of April, quarantines, lockdowns and restrictions on freedom of 
movement were introduced in more than 90 countries, confining 3.9 billion people, half 
the world's population. However, the situation in Asia appeared to be improving, with no 
deaths reported in China for the first time since the start of the pandemic, and all positive 
cases were imported2. This situation contrasts with the United States, which surpassed 
Italy in deaths, and became the country with the highest number of Covid deaths with 
more than 19,000. 
Although the health crisis in China was controlled relatively quickly, this was not the case 
for the economic crisis, because the nation's GDP declined during the January to March 
quarter of 2020 after decades of continuous and uninterrupted growth. It seems that the 
economic crisis that will come after the health crisis will also undermine the welfare of 
humanity, but in this case on an economic dimension. One of the most important 
economic consequences at the time was that the price of oil fell to historic lows.  
 
The new phase of this historic event will be characterized by the relaxation of restrictions, 
by the European cohesion of the member countries in economic terms, and by the inter-
company race of the pharmaceutical companies to produce an effective vaccine.  
From the first half of April onwards, the darkest period of the Covid era came to an end, 
since, with regard to the health issue, infections stabilized and, leaving aside the 
individual differences in the situation in each country, most countries began to notice a 
 
2 Positive cases from outside the country's borders. 




slowdown in the slope of the infection curve. European countries begin to relax their 
restrictions from May onwards, trade and borders are reopened again. 
International cohesion will be represented by the political summit of the European area, 
which reaches an agreement between all member countries of the European Union on 
an economic recovery plan for workers, trade, industry and companies of all kinds in 
order to protect the European economic structure. France and Germany took the lead 
and proposed a package of half a billion euros in non-refundable subsidies. 
 The social situation had improved significantly, but although the incidence of those 
affected had declined, the numbers were still rising, reaching 10 million infected by mid-
June. 
The coming months were to be characterized by partial tightening of restrictions due to 
new outbreaks in countries, commonly known as "waves". Countries like Spain and 
Germany implemented such measures, and there were riots in the cities affected by them 
as a direct reaction. 
In November 2020, the pharmaceutical companies "Pfizer", "Gamaleya", and "Moderna" 
release their vaccines with 90%, 92% and 94% effectiveness respectively. However, by 
the end of November and with 60 million infected, it was Pfizer's vaccine that gained the 
most popularity. Vaccination began in December. At the end of 2020 two new pieces of 
news shook the world, generating fear in the population again, the media reported the 
existence of two new variants of the virus, firstly the South African strain, and secondly 
the British strain, noted for its high contagiousness. 
At the turn of the year, the figure of 2 million deaths due to SARS-CoV-2 was exceeded, 
half a million deaths occurred within the American borders, the nation that has been most 
affected by the pandemic, followed by Brazil and India, in terms of the number of people 
affected. As of April 2021, more than 130 million people have been infected and 2.8 
million have died. 
2021 looks set to be a year of challenges, a year of international cohesion in both 
economic and health terms. The WHO has estimated that this will not be the year in 
which the virus can be defeated, and the repercussions are already palpable in our 
society. Central banks, governments, business community and domestic economies 
have suffered notorious adaptations and changes in their activity and reality, and it is in 
this work where we will see all the consequences and changes that Covid-19 has left on 
the Spanish and international macroeconomic panorama. 





In the following data presentation, we will first analyze the first economic shock 
generated by Covid due to its appearance in the Spanish borders and then we will see 
in a more detailed way the evolution of the Spanish economy throughout the three waves 
that the country suffered. 
The beginning of the first wave occurred in March, when cases increased exponentially, 
and the end of the wave in June, when a significant decrease in the number of infected 
cases was observed. 
First macroeconomic demand 
GDP 
Since the economic recovery after the financial crisis of 2008, the Spanish economy has 
grown at a slow but steady pace, without exceeding 2% quarter-on-quarter growth in 
terms of GDP, but without showing negative figures in all these years. 
Nevertheless, the restrictive measures implemented by the government were 
responsible for the decline in GDP in the first quarter of 2020, reaching a variation of -
5.21 percentage points. 
However, this would not be the largest 
decline in the first wave, as in the second 
quarter, the rate of change of GDP would 
fall to 18.48 percentage points, as 
predicted by studies. This is mostly due to 
the fact that the quarantine in Spain took 
place mostly on days in the second 
quarter, so the decline in GDP is sharper 
in this time frame. It was the biggest 
decline in Spanish GDP in history 
(excluding war events). (Banco de 
España, 2020) 
Sectoral Activity 
The pandemic had an unequal impact on the Spanish productive fabric. The magnitude 
of the impact on the sectors would be due to three reasons: the importance of the 
physical factor in their activity, dependence on international trade and the confinement 
measures. With these three variables we can appreciate significant differences between 
sectors. 
Figure 1: Quarter-on-quarter GDP growth rate 








The service sector was the biggest casualty 
of the first wave, as leisure establishments 
were the most affected by the virus. 
Sectoral activity decreased by -7.6% while 
some subgroups such as restaurants saw 
their activity reduced by 11%. 
 The secondary sector saw almost no 
decline in activity in the first quarter, the 
main reason for the 3% decline being that 
countless parts of its production processes 
did not arrive due to production stoppages 
in supplier economies.  
Third, agriculture was barely affected by the restrictions issued by the government and 
workers in the sector were able to work under almost the same conditions as in the pre-
pandemic period, with only a 1% decrease in activity. (Banco de España, 2020) 
Inflation 
Inflation, as measured by the HICP, declined significantly in the first months of 2020.  We 
will analyze the most noteworthy 
components of this indicator, starting 
with energy, which suffered the largest 
year-on-year decline in its price, standing 
at -18% at the end of the first wave. Oil 
prices fell by as much as -66% from 
February to April, due to mobility 
restrictions and international trade 
restrictions. Meanwhile, food 
commodities increased in price due to 
increased demand, transport and 
production costs due to the pandemic. 
They reached their peak in April, before 
stabilizing in June. Inflation, as measured by the HICP, declined significantly in the first 
months of 2020. (Banco de España, 2020) 
 
Figure 3: Year-on-year change in CPI, energy and food prices 
Source: Banco de España (2020) “Informe trimestral de la economía 
española 3/2020”  
 
Figure 2: Sectoral activity variation in the first wave 









The virulence of the Covid effect on Spanish employment and wages was almost 
unprecedented in the history of the Spanish economy. 
Social security enrolment in the first month of the pandemic fell by 851,000 workers. In 
the first days of the same month, the growth of affiliates continued its constant rate of 
growth (65,000 workers in the first fortnight), but by the time the perimetral closure and 
quarantine were established, the number of affiliates decreased by almost 900,000 
workers, 70% of whom belonged to the temporary work sector. 
The figures improved temporarily in April, when the application of ERTES started to take 
effect. This measure made the market more flexible and helped the productive sector to 
breathe, but it also had a significant impact on the number of redundancies, which could 
have been much higher. In numbers, at the end of March the number of workers covered 
by the ERTEs was 3,386,000, workers who were not counted as redundancies in the 
social security system but who also ceased their work activity. (UGT, 2020) 
   
Trade and balance of payments 
The first wave generated a historic decline in international trade, which was reflected in 
domestic imports and exports. Between April and June, exports fell by 33.5% and imports 
by 28.8%. The importance of the travel restriction in Spanish tourism stands out, due to 
its weight in the Spanish economy. The export of services was largely affected by this 
factor, causing (among others) the net external balance to fall by 2.3% of national GDP. 
At the end of the second 
quarter, exports in particular 
seemed to show a recovery 
trend, with a year-on-year fall 
of 9.1%, when previously they 
had reached levels of 33.5%.3 
(Banco de España, 2020) 
 
 
3 The year-on-year rate of decline of imports was 18.6% in June, when months earlier it had 
reached 28.8%. 
Figure 4: Annual variation of exports and imports of good 
 
Source: Own elaboration. Data from BdE (2020) 
 





The general government balance has been strongly linked to the health situation at all 
times. The Council of the European Union allowed countries to conduct the necessary 
fiscal policies in proportion to the health 
impact of the pandemic on them. Spain in 
April delivered its budgets, which estimated 
a deficit of 10.3% by the end of the year, 
exceeding the proposed 2019 deficit of 
2.8%. At the end of the first wave, the deficit 
was 7%. (Banco de España, 2021) 
 
Overall Macroeconomic Impact 
GDP 
In the overall analysis of the pandemic, we can infer that there were two practically 
opposite time intervals, therefore, we will segment the pandemic into two stages, the first 
and the second half of 2020.  
In the first half of the year, the quantitative effects were noticeable in the spanish 
economy. In the first quarter there was a remarkable decline in GDP, which was relatively 
huge considering the preceding quarters, and relatively small considering the second 
quarter of 2020, where the fall was more dramatic. It can be said that the first quarter 
would serve as a premonitory precedent for what would happen in the second quarter of 
2020 in terms of GDP. In the second quarter the measures were finally implemented and 
gross domestic product fell by 17.9% compared to the 5.3% decline of the first quarter. 
The first wave, therefore, left us with a cumulative decline in GDP of 23.2%. 
This makes sense given that the restrictive measures to combat the virus were 
implemented in March. Restrictions on mobility, closures of non-essential businesses, 
general quarantine, limitation of international trade, and almost total decline in tourism 
were the most significant and explanatory reasons for the decline in Spanish GDP in the 
second quarter of the year. (Lockdown Accounting, 2021) 
The second distinguishable stage in this pandemic was known as the "second wave", 
which spanned from June to December, and saw a drastic reversal of the very negative 
GDP trend of the previous 6 months. 
 
Source: Own elaboration. Data from BdE (2020) 
 
Figure 5: General government revenue and expenditure 
*Twelve-month cumulative 
 




Once the first wave was over, the "economy-public health" dilemma (Lin & Meissner, 
2020) was no longer so notable, and the central government was given the go-ahead to 
relax the harshness of the health restrictions, which caused Spanish GDP to pick up 
again in month-on-month terms. It increased by 16.4 percentage points, causing the 
Spanish economy to partially recover and drawing the much mentioned "asymmetric V" 
that so many economists had previously predicted. 
However, in the last quarter of 2020 growth was again severely reduced without 
becoming negative, the reversal of the situation in productive terms was already reversed 
in the third quarter, in the fourth quarter there was barely any growth compared to the 
third quarter. The decline in growth in the final months of the year can be partly explained 
by the increase in contagions and the consequent implementation of more severe 
restrictive measures after the summer. Nevertheless, the data recorded ended up being 
more favorable than the Bank of Spain's predictions. 
The last quarter of 2020 and the first quarter of 2021 were very similar in terms of growth, 
there was a small inter-monthly variation due to occasional resurgences in the number 
of cases and the imposition of short-lived measures, which limited GDP growth.  
In conclusion, the GDP variation was slightly negative in the first months of 2020, where 
activity had not come to a complete standstill, in the second quarter where it did, it 
suffered the most abrupt fall of the pandemic, with its 
subsequent extremely positive reaction and a 
noticeable increase in GDP in the summer months, 
which came together with the resumption of all 
economic activity in the third quarter. From 
November 2020 to the present, the change in GDP 
has been almost negligible, due to the 
implementation of temporary restrictions because of 
small upturns in the number of infected people.  
If we were to rely on a simple model such as the IS-LM (Hicks, 1937), we would find a 
significant decrease in the marginal propensity to consume and therefore an increase in 
the marginal propensity to save which decreased household consumption and therefore 
aggregate demand. The government's immediate response was to apply an 
expansionary fiscal policy by increasing public spending. 
In this sense, it is worth mentioning that the decrease in consumption was not the 
justification for the decrease in GDP; what affected the most was the cessation of 
production, which originated due to an exogenous shock. 
Figure 6: Quarterly GDP growth of Spain and the 
European zone 
Source: Own elaboration. Data: BdE, BCE, INE (2021) 
 




Economic recovery is still a long way off. With GDP declining by 11% in 2020, the 
asymmetric V has not been completed and the OECD estimates that the full recovery of 




The health crisis has affected the Spanish economy as a whole in a very unequal and 
heterogeneous way, so it is more practical to analyze the macroeconomic consequences 
in a more disaggregated way by looking at the real impact on the productive sectors. 
As of March 2021, we can see the variation in the Gross Value Added of each sector 
with respect to the previous year. 
Primary sector 
In terms of gross value added, the agri-food sector was the sector that most benefited 
from the coronavirus crisis.  
If we analyze the sector in terms of activity, since March 2020 it declined relatively slightly 
with the rest of the sectors, reaching its lowest point of activity in May with a -11.7%, with 
manufacturing reaching a figure of -38.1% only one month earlier. This is because the 
restrictions imposed by the central government affected this sector less and it was able 
to continue its activity relatively normally compared to the rest. The level of pre-pandemic 
activity is expected to recover in 2023.  
In month-on-month terms, the gross value added of GDP grew at a constant rate of 
around 4%, which is curious considering the aforementioned decline in activity. In year-
on-year terms the gross value added of agriculture is up to 8.73%. This fact should not 
surprise us since agriculture in Spain has always behaved counter-cyclically in terms of 
GVA. 
Likewise, the percentage contribution of agriculture has also increased, mainly due to 
two causes. The first is due to the quarantine period and the limitation of international 
trade, which caused the demand for national food products to soar, and the second 
reason is the strong negative impact on the rest of the sectors, which made the primary 
 
4 According to BBVAResearch it will increase by 5.5% in 2021 and by 7.0% in 2022. 
 




sector contribute a relatively higher percentage of GDP. In terms of gross value added, 
the agri-food sector was the sector that most benefited from the coronavirus crisis.  
If we analyze the sector in terms of activity, since March 2020 it declined relatively 
slightly with the rest of the sectors, reaching its lowest point of activity in May with a      
-11.7%, with manufacturing reaching a figure of -38.1% only one month earlier. This is 
because the 
restrictions imposed 
by the central 
government affected 
this sector less and it 
was able to continue 
its activity relatively 
normally compared to 
the rest. The level of 
pre-pandemic activity 
is expected to 
recover in 20235.  
In month-on-month 
terms, the gross value added of GDP grew at a constant rate of around 4%, which is 
curious considering the aforementioned decline in activity. In year-on-year terms the 
gross value added of agriculture is up to 8.73%6.  This fact should not surprise us since 
agriculture in Spain has always behaved counter-cyclically in terms of GVA. 
Likewise, the percentage contribution of agriculture has also increased, mainly due to 
two causes. The first is due to the quarantine period and the limitation of international 
trade, which caused the demand for national food products to soar, and the second 
reason is the strong negative impact on the rest of the sectors, which made the primary 
sector contribute a relatively higher percentage of GDP. (Montoriol-Garriga, 2020) 
Secondary sector 
It was the second sector most affected by the crisis. 
In terms of activity, the manufacturing sector declined to a low of -38.1% in April, and 
closed the year with a 1.4% year-on-year change, although after the third wave in 
January 2021 it has fallen back to -4.1%.  
 
5 According to a Caixabank study on the agri-food sector. 
6 See figure 12. 
Figure 7: Spain's real GDP, GVA and contribution to GDP of the primary 
sector 
Source: J. Montoriol (2020) La fortaleza del sector agroalimentario durante la 
crisis del coronavirus. [Figure] Retrieved from: 
https://www.caixabankresearch.com/es/analisis-
sectorial/agroalimentario/fortaleza-del-sector-agroalimentario-durante-crisis-




If we analyze in a more disaggregated way, the pharmaceutical sector was the only 
component of the 28 components of the secondary sector that grew (due to the demand 
for pharmaceutical drugs and medicines), the rest plummeted, with special mention to 
the textile sector, which reached a figure of -26%. 
This significant slump can be explained by the high weight of the automotive sector in 
the secondary sector and in GDP in general. Spain is a country noted for its strong 
automotive sector and this crisis has particularly affected this sector at the international 
level. In addition, the paralysis of international trade has led to cuts in the production 
chain of Spanish companies that needed supplies and components for the production 
process, which had to be imported from China or any other foreign country, as Spain is 
a country that is highly dependent on foreign trade. The construction sector has also 
been severely affected, reaching figures of -18.18% in the level of activity with respect 
to the first four months of last year. (Martínez, 2021) 
98% of the companies in the sector are SMEs and will have to restructure or change 
their production model in order to continue their activity in the Spanish productive fabric. 
The Bank of Spain estimates a full recovery of the sector in 2023. 
Tertiary sector 
It is undoubtedly the sector most affected by the crisis, and at the same time, the sector 
that contributes most to the Spanish GDP. Specialization in the tourism and hospitality 
sectors of the Spanish economy has been a significant factor explaining why Spain has 
been one of the countries most affected by the health crisis worldwide. 
The service sector contributes more than ¾ of the Spanish GDP, and in the worst months 
of the pandemic its activity decreased by 40%; in restaurant sector in particular, the level 
of activity was reduced by almost 100%, a figure never seen before in Spanish economic 
history. 
The fact that the inflow of tourists in 2020 was reduced by 75% is one of the main factors 
for the average decrease in turnover to be 15.6% in 2020, with the worst month being 
April, with a decrease of 41.5%. 
The tertiary sector items that were most affected were those related to tourism, with 
travel agencies being the hardest hit with a 75% drop in turnover, while in sectors such 
as hotels it was 68%. From February 2020 to the present day, the monthly turnover has 
been falling year-on-year. (Banco de España, 2021) 




In terms of employment, the situation is not favorable either. From the beginning of the 
pandemic until the first months of 2021, employment has fallen by an average of 4%, 
making the economic crisis situation palpable, as these figures have not been seen since 
the financial crisis of 2008. No sector increased its number of affiliates in the Social 
Security, all had decreases, especially the hospitality sector with 13.3%. (UGT, 2020) 
Although in the summer months mobility increased almost 100% again due to the 
relaxation of the containment measures, the world was still shocked by the news and 
international confidence was very low, to the point that only 25% of the tourists who 
visited Spain last year came to the country. Our economy, so specialized in the 
hospitality sector and so heavily dependent on tourism, was severely affected. All this, 
together with the fact that most companies in the sector are SMEs and many of them 
need income from the tourism that the country received in subsequent years, led many 
companies to reduce staff in order to have liquidity in their accounts and to be able to 
keep their businesses open. 
However, referring to Milton Friedman's theory (1993), the countries that are most 
affected by an economic crisis are more likely to bounce back stronger in the recovery 
years, which is known as the rebound effect. In this way, although what has sunk the 
Spanish GDP the most has been the disastrous figures for the services sector, it will be 
the same sector that will lead the recovery in the coming years. Whether the economic 
recovery takes place in a closer or more distant context depends on the level of 
vaccination of the world population, but the OECD estimates that the level of activity 
before the pandemic will recover in 2022 or in 2023 in the least favorable scenario.  
Figure 8: Year-on-year change in employment and turnover in the services sector 
Source: Own elaboration. Data: INE 





During the whole year 2020 we have been able to appreciate an average inflation rate 
of -0.3%, but as we have done in the previous section, we cannot speak of a 
homogeneous impact of Covid-19 on this macroeconomic aggregate, the variation in 
prices has been heterogeneous and must be analyzed in a disaggregated way. 
We should highlight the great importance of the prices of energy products in this rate, 
since the decrease in the price of these has been more than notorious. A clear example 
of this has been the price of oil barrels, which oscillated around 0$ during the worst 
moments of April, when its price before the pandemic oscillated around 60$. The crisis 
had deflationary repercussions on the inflation rate of energy products, as their price fell 
by 9.8%. 
With respect to services, we can see that in year-on-year terms only 1 out of 5 subclasses 
of services have shown deflation. However, most of the subclasses have shown a lower 
growth rate during 2020, the rates being positive, therefore, we cannot speak of deflation 
in services but rather of a decrease in inflationary growth. The most remarkable case 
was that of hotel services prices, which were increasing at a level of 3.4%, and in the 
pandemic went to inflation rates of -18%. (Fernández, 2021) 
Another interesting subgroup to analyze in the basket of goods and services that the CPI 
traces is food, which in general terms increased its inflationary trend, due to the fact that 
the demand for these goods increased from April onwards and there were also problems 
in the production chains of the agricultural sector due to the preventive restrictions of the 
months of the second quarter of 2020, which meant that the supply did not match the 
demand at the time and the prices of food products became more expensive. (Hicks, 
1937) 
Finally, in the first months of 2021, more specifically in January, there has been a 
corrective effect and the CPI rose to 0.4%, an increase that was a consequence of the 
increase in the price of energy products. In February this increase was corrected and the 
CPI fell again by -0.1%. (Banco de España, 2021) 
It is worth mentioning that the year-on-year variation of inflation in Spain has been more 
abrupt than in the Euro zone in times of pandemic, confirming once again the volatility of 
Spanish prices in times of crisis. In the following months, values above 1% are expected 
due to the base effect of energy products and subgroups such as the hotel and catering 
and hotel sector, as there will be a corrective effect on their prices due to the 
improvement of the tourist situation thanks to the vaccination processes. 




On the other hand, an element to take into account is the Phillips curve, where, according 
to this theory, an increase in inflation leads to a decrease in unemployment (1958). If in 
the coming months, with the full reactivation of the economy, the demand for products, 
and therefore prices, increases, we could see a small recovery in employment in Spain. 
 
Employment 
In terms of unemployment, the effect has been more unified and homogeneous by 
sectors, affecting all economic activity. 
Similar figures have not been seen since 2009. At the end of 2020, 724,000 people were 
registered as unemployed and 360,000 jobs were destroyed. In the worst month of the 
pandemic, the year-on-year rate of registered unemployment reached 28.09%.  
A considerable part of the business fabric of all types of activity has been destroyed, but 
the group most affected by the crisis was undoubtedly the hospitality sector. In the past 
year, 243,000 registrations were recorded in the Social Security due to the severe 
restrictions on mobility and leisure activities. Spanish hotels, bars, restaurants and 
hostels, which have seen their assets and economic capacity shrink as a result of the 
severe restrictions on both domestic and international travel, directly influencing the 
number of workers on their payrolls. In year-on-year terms, unemployment in the tourism 
sector has risen by 19%. 
Figure 9: Year-on-year change in employment and turnover in the services sector 
Source: Own elaboration. Data: BdE 




In the secondary sector the situation has not become as critical but the figures are still 
not at all favorable. Industry, 
manufacturing, and construction have 
added 40,200, 41,000 and 44,100 people 
to unemployment in 12 months 
respectively. 
ERTEs were introduced when the entire 
country was in quarantine, and at the time 
it was intended to be temporary and 
workers would eventually return to their 
jobs as normal. At the end of 2020, 
755,000 people were under ERTE, a 
higher number than in previous months.  
The counterpart is the public sector activities. Public administrations added 31,000 new 
registrations, but for obvious reasons, health was the sector with the highest number of 
social security registrations in 2020, and although its level has fallen again in the third 
wave because health workers are not needed as much, the pandemic months saw an 
unprecedented increase in terms of health employability. Education, on the other hand, 
created 18,400 new jobs. (UGT, 2020) 
It is undoubtedly only the public sector that is trying to avoid the downturn in terms of 
employment, the private sector is the most affected by this crisis, not only in terms of 
employment, but also in terms of activity and turnover.7 
The Spanish labor model was already characterized by its precariousness, high 
unemployment and temporality, and this crisis has increased these inequalities and 
features (Fana, Torrejón, & Fernandez-Macías, 2020), the clearest difference can be 
found between workers who could resort to teleworking and those who could not. 
Moreover, as affirmed in a 1999 study (Mocan), the increase in unemployment causes 
income inequality, and the level of inequality may increase in the following months, which 
can be measured by the Gini index. 
Finally, it is necessary to mention that the unemployment generated by the pandemic 
was not "natural" as unemployment was catalogued in the 1930's. However, 
unemployment is involuntary (Keynes, 1936) in this case and generated due to a 
 
7 See sectoral analysis section. 
Figure 10: Year-on-year change in registered employment 
Source: Own elaboration. Data: BdE 




tremendous shock in the demand for labor that has produced an excess of supply in 
the labor market.  
Trade and balance of payments 
We could define the evolution of trade and balance of payments in 3 parts:  
- The first wave was one of the biggest shocks to international trade in history, causing 
Spanish exports and imports to fall by 33.5% and 28.8% compared to the previous year.  
- In the first half of the second wave the trend seemed to be more beneficial for our trade 
balance, contributing 2.2% of GDP, but at the end of the year the balance closed again 
with a negative balance, -0.5% of GDP. (See figure 15) 
- Finally, we can infer from the last wave that its trend seems positive, due to the increase 
in international trade and above all to our export capacity in the manufacturing sector. 
On the other hand, negative effects are expected to be produced by Brexit and its limiting 
repercussions on the free movement of goods, in addition to the situation of the Eurozone 
countries, since due to their restrictions they have stopped generating tourism at our 
borders and a negative effect on the balance of trade is expected. However, it is expected 
that the levels of exports and imports of goods prior to the pandemic will be recovered, 
which is a clear indicator of economic recovery. 
On the other hand, as Thirlwall stated (1979), a 
negative balance of payments cannot be 
maintained permanently, and Spain has been 
running a deficit trend in its balance of payments 
for years. As some studies have confirmed, it is 
likely that its long-term economic growth will be 
diminished by this fact (Lanzafame, 2014), but to 
confirm this assertion a quantitative analysis 
should be made (which is usually complex in this 
case) and confirm that Thirlwall's law is fulfilled 
in the Spanish nation. 
Public accounts 
In overall terms, the biggest drain on the public coffers occurred at the beginning of the 
year due to the immense expenditure caused by the health crisis in terms of subsidies 
and benefits to Spanish companies and households. 
In the third quarter of last year, public spending was able to relax due in part to the 
reactivation and independence of support from public institutions. However, in the fourth 
Figure 11: Year-on-year and quarter-on-quarter 
change in exports and imports of goods 
Source: Banco de España: “Informe trimestral de la 
economía española 1/2021” (2021) 
 




quarter, due to the increase in cases caused by the second wave, the public coffers 
decreased at a higher rate than in the preceding months, reaching 6.4% higher in annual 
terms. At the same time, the level of debt increased by more than 20% compared to last 
year at the end of 2020, reaching 117%, a relatively small figure compared to neighboring 
countries such as Italy. With respect to the third wave, public spending has continued to 
increase, reaching 125% of GDP in the first quarter.  
As Keynes mentioned in his general theory (1936), public spending will reactivate the 
economy in a period of recession such as the current one; however, Keynesian 
expansionary policy in this case has been more focused on supporting the neediest 
companies and families than on increasing the level of aggregate demand. Consumption 
fell by almost a third in the months of the pandemic, therefore, the accumulated savings 
of those months will cause the marginal propensity to consume to increase today and 















Figure 12: Public revenue and expenditure 
Source: Own elaboration. Data: BdE 





Collecting data to analyse the evolution of the pandemic has never been easy, and the 
volatility of the data means that we are presented with several scenarios, depending on 
two factors: the economic impact and the health impact of the crisis. 
- Economic impact: persistence of pandemic behaviour in economic agents, destruction 
of the Spanish economic structure, national and international policies applied. 
- Health impact: vaccination levels, percentage of society infected and therefore 
subsequently immunised, citizen obedience and mutation or non-mutation of the virus.8 
Each scenario has a different combination of these components. First, the most 
favourable scenario estimates that by mid-2021, vaccination will be at advanced levels 
and the population will be highly immunised. Secondly, the stable intermediate scenario 
states that this controlled and advanced pandemic situation will be realised by the end 
of the year, taking into account that there will be rebounds throughout the year. Finally, 
the most severe scenario states that relapses and waves are reluctant, and both the 
number of infected and the number of vaccinated do not improve in such a short period 
of time. 
GDP projections 
In year-on-year terms, GDP would grow by 6%, 5.3%, and 1.6% in 2021, 2022, and 2023 
respectively, with gains in the second half of 2021 due to improved progress in vaccine 
implementation, GDP growth would be 
steeper and more optimistic in the best 
case, and the severe scenario would 
be as much as half that of the 
intermediate scenario. Full recovery to 
pre-pandemic GDP levels is estimated 
to occur in 2023, while in the best case 
it would be in the first four months of 
2022, and in the worst case in the long 
term, in a year beyond 2023. (Banco 
de España, 2020) 
 
8 The mutation of the virus would make the developed vaccines obsolete and would again 
greatly complicate the health and economic situation in the country, so it is a factor to be taken 
into account. 
Figure 13: GDP growth rate projections 
Source: Own elaboration. Data: BdE 




The IMF's longer-term projections estimate a scenario very similar to the intermediate 
scenario proposed by the Bank of Spain, with the largest growth occurring in the first 
year after the pandemic, with its subsequent progressive reduction in the following 
years. This refers to the asymmetric V-shaped recovery, also known as the "two-phase 
recovery", the first phase being the reactivation of the productive fabric and the second 
referring to the restructuring of the Spanish productive fabric. In the first phase, the 
companies that have been able to continue covering their fixed costs return to their 
activity, the activity prior to the pandemic is not recovered because the most inefficient 
companies have left the market, 
but the majority return to 
normality. In the second phase, 
companies undergo structuring 
and adaptation to the new market 
conditions, the companies that do 
not manage to adapt disappear 
and the companies with new 
adapted production models move 
on. (De Cos, 2020) 
Projected unemployment rate  
In its most favourable scenario, the Bank of Spain estimates a recovery to pre-pandemic 
levels at the beginning of 2021, a figure that has not been achieved in March due to 
registered unemployment being 11% higher than last year at this time. In an intermediate 
scenario, the unemployment figure of 15.5% would be equalised by the end of 2021, 
where ERTES would cease to be used with the frequency of the end of 2020, the 
forecasts for this are not very favourable, because ERTES are estimated to have a longer 
stay in our economy than expected by the government. The third scenario shows a 
decreasing trend in unemployment from 2021, but no recovery in employment is 
expected before 2023. The numbers show a trend closer to the third scenario, even 
though the health situation is much better than in the most severe scenario. (Banco de 
España, 2020) 
Figure 14: Long-term GDP growth rate projections 
Source: Own elaboration. Data: FMI 




On the other hand, the IMF 
estimates that the recovery in the 
level of unemployment will not 
take place over a period of 6 
years, in fact, it does foresee an 
improvement in national statistics 
but estimates an irreversible 
effect on the Spanish 
employment panorama over this 
entire period. Structural 
unemployment is notorious in our 
economy and the international authorities are not benevolent with their projections, and 
if the employment recovery does take place, it will be over a much longer horizon, but 
with such a time difference the projections tend to be predictions rather than empirical 









Public debt projections 
Spain has significantly increased its debt in order to face the economic and health crisis, 
to sustain the activity of the productive fabric and to help Spanish families, as we have 
already mentioned.  
From this starting point there are three possible scenarios: the first is the most comforting 
for the public coffers because it estimates that government debt will fall by 2021, but the 
reality is that the estimated trend is totally counter-intuitive with respect to the data 
published, so the most feasible projections are the following two. In the intermediate 
scenario the level of debt would remain stable over the coming years, oscillating with 
Figure 15: Unemployment rate projections 
Source: Own elaboration. Data: BdE 
Figure 16: Long-term unemployment rate projections 
Source: Own elaboration. Data: FMI 




respect to the initial pre-pandemic level. This prediction is also the one most widely 
accepted by international economic authorities, who expect the level of debt to stabilize 
and oscillate at the level it was in 2020. The most severe scenario marks a clear upward 
trend in Spanish debt, as this is a hypothetical situation in which the administrations will 
have to continue to meet the costs of maintaining the country's economic and social 
landscape. (Banco de España, 2020) 
Although the hypothesis most widely accepted by the administrations was that of a 
central scenario, recently published empirical data tend to verify that public debt will 
continue to rise, making it more plausible that 
we could find ourselves in the most severe 
event horizon possible in terms of 
employment, since public debt at the 
beginning of 2021 reached levels of 125% of 
GDP, with even more upward projections. 
Some of the effects of such a high level of 
debt can be expected to be a lower GDP 
growth in long-term terms, due to lower 
investment and capital stock and thus lower 
labor productivity. (Kumar & Jaejoon, 2010) 
Inflation projections 
The upturn in economic activity and above all demand is expected to increase the CPI 
in the coming years. An important component of the consumption basket will be hotels 
and catering and tourism, which will lead the increase in prices in annual terms, as these 
sectors were strongly affected in terms of sales during the peak season last year. In 
addition to its annual percentage increase, its weight in the economy should be 
highlighted, which makes it one of the most important components of the CPI. 
On the other hand, it is worth mentioning the price of energy, which, due to the expected 
increase in oil prices, will also play an important role in the future inflationary process.  
The highest annual growth rate is expected to be seen in 2021, more specifically in the 
first half of the year, showing also a decrease in the second half, all this due to the 
previous trends in 2020, which greatly condition this indicator. 
Figure 17: Public debt projections 
Source: Own elaboration. Data: BdE 




In the most favourable case in 2023 a price increase of 1.3% over the previous year 
would be reached, and in the most severe scenario 1% due to the assumed lower 











As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, while the virus was being fought in Asia, 
it was beginning to spread in Europe, and before the United States was the country most 
affected worldwide, the European area was undoubtedly the geographical area most 
affected by the pandemic.  
Despite the fact that the European Union is a body that stands for the ideal of 
convergence and cooperation, due to the speed of the virus and the unpreparedness of 
its member countries, the pandemic was fought in a very heterogeneous and 
decentralised way in the first instance. Since the response to the crisis had to be 
immediate at the national level, no coordinated containment mechanism could be put in 
place at the first impact of the virus, and each country implemented its own policies, 
measures and restrictions as it saw fit without any supranational oversight. Later this was 
no longer the case, but in the first wave each country decided for itself, with its own 
mechanisms. Obviously most countries applied somewhat similar measures, such as 
border closures or expansionary fiscal policies, but these were not direct instructions 
from any supranational body.  
At this point, three notable distinctions can be made by with respect to the different 
strategies that were applied to deal with the health crisis: advocating immunisation of the 
population through the herd effect (Sweden and the UK), applying strong restrictive 
Figure 18: CPI projections 
Source: Own elaboration. Data: BdE 




measures (Spain, France and Italy), and anticipating the crisis (Slovakia, Ireland and 
Germany). (Álvarez & Cabeza, 2020) 
Application of strong restrictive measures 
The first of the three strategies we are going to analyse usually refers to the first countries 
in which positive cases of coronavirus were reported. These policies were applied in 
countries where the reaction time to the pandemic was very limited and experience in 
dealing with this type of crisis was lacking. However, the speed with which they were 
implanted was decisive, since a 2020 study determined that a week's difference in 
quarantine implantation could mean the loss of half a million lives. (Balmford, Annan, 
Hargreaves, Altoè, & Bateman) 
Italy, France and Spain are examples of the strategy of implementing restrictive 
measures. 
In Italy, a state of emergency was declared on 31 January after the arrival of tourists with 
Covid in the country, and the pandemic broke out in full a month later, when local 
outbreaks were active in the Lombardy region, the most affected area in the whole 
region. Another month later, on 11 March, the country's economic activity was almost 
completely paralysed, the only activities that could continue to function were the essential 
ones, which also had restricted opening hours.  
In the health repercussions of Italy's management, we find a notorious shortage of 
medical supplies, a fact that marked the fight against the virus, as a large number of 
health personnel became infected (8% of the infected population as of April). 
In economic repercussions we find a similar trend to the countries that used this policy 
package, with the second half of the year being the most severely affected in quarter-on-
quarter terms due to the restrictions imposed, in the second half of the year growth is 
exacerbated, in line with the "asymmetric V" recovery. In annual terms, GDP declined by 
-18.2% in the second quarter, a decline second only to the World War II era. The CPI 
remained stable in the first wave, oscillating between -1 and +1 percentage point. On the 
other hand, the unemployment rate at the 
end of June 2020 was 9.9%, while in 
February it was 9.08%, currently it is 10.7%. 
Workers saw a considerable reduction in 
their wages due to the reduction in hours 
worked and the least skilled jobs were the 
most affected due to the low ability to adapt 
Source: Own elaboration. Data: ISTAT 
Table 1: Quarter-on-quarter change in GDP of Italy 




to teleworking, a fact that accentuates inequality in the nation. The growth of public debt 
is the most remarkable fact about the Italian economy, since in order to cope with the 
pandemic it needed a huge amount of money that had to be requested from the 
European authorities and generated a great debate between the countries of southern 
Europe, which do not have healthy accounts, and those of the north, which lend money 
and apply austere policies so that their public debt does not increase excessively. In mid-
2020 its debt stood at 135% of GDP and at the end of the year it stood at 155%. It is the 
second highest after Greece. 
On the other hand, France chose to impose measures and restrictions similar to those 
imposed in Italy and Spain. On 17 March 2020, they decreed the closure of all teaching 
sites and began their home confinement with 4,500 people affected by the virus. Despite 
detecting their first case in January, the authorities acted 6 weeks late, when there were 
several active local foci. This lack of speed, as in Spain, meant that the strong restrictive 
measures lost their effectiveness, and as a result there was a generalised hospital 
collapse that caused the mortality rate of the virus to be very high.9  At the end of the first 
wave, 25,000 deaths were recorded, of which 9,000 were elderly. It is worth noting that 
the main criticism of Macron's management was the lack of initiative to protect old 
people's homes and mass testing of the population, as was the case in the countries that 
opted for this strategy. On the economic front, in the first wave he announced that SMEs 
would be exempt from taxes and social security contributions for the duration of the 
pandemic, and for large companies he announced a deferral of these payments. The 
government provided 460 billion euros in aid to the French productive fabric and to the 
households that needed it most, and in July it announced another 100 billion euros that 
would finalise the famous "Reactivation Plan". 
The consequences of the pandemic and the central government's policies have left us 
with indicators almost identical to those of Spain and Italy. Quarterly GDP growth traces 
the typical trend of a two-stage recovery, with much of the activity picking up in the third 
quarter.  
 
9 Average virus mortality rate: 3.5-4%. 
France mortality rate: 14.7%. 
Spain and Italy mortality rates: 12%. 
(May 2020 data) 




Regarding the unemployment rate, as in all Euro zone countries, there is a noticeable 
decrease in the second quarter, due to the fact that the data for the statistics are skewed. 
This is due to the fact that those who were technically classified as unemployed were no 
longer classified as unemployed because they were unable to look for work during that 
period. The rate is now equivalent to pre-pandemic levels, showing that the pandemic 
had little effect on the French labour market. The inflation rate went from growing at a 
rate of about 1.5% to settle at 0.7% year-
on-year in March and even settled at 
0.2% in the following months, due to the 
decrease in the demand for products and 
the decrease in the price of energy and 
oil. (Álvarez & Cabeza, 2020) 
 
Respecting individual liberties 
The second option consists of delegating responsibility to individual citizens, establishing 
few restrictions and limitations on the individual freedoms of individuals, and advocating 
for the immunization of the population through the herd effect. This strategy is the most 
liberal of those that we will analyze, but at the same time it has been the most criticized 
by politicians, the population and the media. It is with this methodology of action that the 
trade-off between the economy and public health is most clearly seen. The greatest 
exponents of this set of policies are Sweden and the United Kingdom, countries on which 
we will focus our attention in order to understand the essence of this strategy and the 
results offered by it.   
Firstly, Sweden is a country that was more affected in numbers than its Nordic 
neighbours, reaching a figure of 8,000 cases per million inhabitants10. At the beginning 
of April 2021, more than 1,000,000 people were infected and more than 14,000 died. 
It was a country that was not noted for its anticipation of events, ignoring the first cases 
in January and reaching 200 cases per day in March, when an estimated $4,000,000 in 
government assistance was prepared to deal with the virus. The first restrictive measure 
came in the same month, which was a limitation of mass events to a maximum of 500 
attendees (days later it was reduced to 50). They did not legislate on home isolation, so 
there was free movement during the first impact of the virus, but the restriction on foreign 
travel increased proportionally to the number of cases registered, even prohibiting non-
 
10 Data from 1st June 2020. 
Source: Own elaboration. Data: INSEE 
Table 2: Quarter-on-quarter change in GDP of France 




essential travel outside their borders. Its testing policy was very limited (and criticised) at 
first, and the increase in cases in the first few weeks led the government to correct this 
and begin to implement a policy of mass testing.  
On the health front there was never any collapse of health services and on the economic 
front in the second quarter GDP fell by 8.2% year-on-year, despite the fact that there 
was no confinement and leisure establishments remained open. In 2020, thanks to the 
recovery in the second half of the year, GDP fell by 6 percentage points overall, and is 
expected to grow by 3.1% in 2021. Given that the growth rate in the first quarter of 2021 
was +0.1%, Sweden's economy was not classified as being in a state of economic 
recession. However, compared to its neighbouring countries, it had almost five times as 
many deaths per million inhabitants and its GDP growth rates are no better than those 
of its neighbouring countries. (AFP, 2020) The only point in favor of this policy with 
respect to its neighboring countries was the very first impact of covid on GDP, which was 
minor, however, in the following months this advantage was reduced due to the increase 
in cases due to the limited restrictions. (Bricco, Misch, & Solovye, 2020) 
 
The second case, similar to the Swedish one and even better known, is that of the United 
Kingdom. The British Isles country fits into this pandemic management strategy because, 
although it did impose compulsory home isolation, it did so a month later than its 
European neighbours. This was a less severe case than Sweden's but more 
controversial because of the focus that was established by the media. 
The first case was detected on the same day as Brexit, 31 January 2020. A health 
information bombardment began in February and by March cases were detected in all 
parts of the British Isles. 
The government underestimated the importance of the situation: while countries in 
southern Europe were being severely affected by the virus, the UK remained at an 
"intermediate" level of severity. However, at the end of March the country was 
quarantined. The delay in implementing this measure was widely criticised, as the 
government's initial idea was to obtain a naturally immunised society, either by means of 
a vaccine or by the "herd effect" (as in Sweden), but this option was rejected due to the 
recommendations of health professionals after a notable increase in the number of cases 
in the country. On the other hand, the government approved a package of economic 
measures based on the reactivation of the productive fabric, tax reductions for 
companies on the verge of bankruptcy, among others...  




Health workers complained about the lack of sanitary supplies due to the delay in the 
reaction, a fact that was significant when it came to registering cases, which at the 
beginning of April exceeded 41,000 affected, making it one of the countries most affected 
by the virus worldwide. At the beginning of April 2021, 4,500,000 people were affected 
and 128,000 people had died. 
At the economic level, unemployment stood at 5.0% at the end of the year (1.3% more 
than the previous year). GDP growth on a month-on-month basis was quite 
heterogeneous at the quarterly level (see 
table 3).  
While in year-on-year terms the GDP decline 
was -9.9% in 2020, far exceeding the 
historical record of -4.1%, despite this a 
recovery in 2021 of 1.2% is expected. 
Anticipation to the crisis 
The third and final virus defence strategy was anticipation of the virus. This option was 
the most difficult to execute due to the fact that the information available at the beginning 
of the year was practically nil, not to mention the disinformation surrounding the virus 
environment. The countries that were ahead of the rest in terms of legislation are today 
considered visionaries because they dealt with the virus more efficiently and effectively. 
Countries following this strategy share common characteristics long before active 
pockets were identified within the country in question: 
- Stockpiling of medical supplies 
- Massive information campaigns for the population 
- Mobilisation of health workers 
- Protocols for action in the event that the virus enters the border 
- Implementation of premature restrictive measures 
Clear examples are Ireland and Germany. 
Ireland at the end of the first wave, in July, had 26,000 infected and 1,700 dead. Their 
first infected person was registered relatively late, at the end of February, and in less 
than 2 weeks they legislated and approved their respective restrictions, such as capacity 
limitations, activity bans, etc. On 24 March, there was a complete restriction of movement 
and a cessation of economic activity. 
Source: Own elaboration. Data: ONS 
Table 3: Quarter-on-quarter change in GDP of UK 




In the health sector, Ireland was not prepared for the pandemic. It has a mixed health 
system with a heavy reliance on the private sector, so the government had to contract 
for the hospitalisation of those infected in private hospitals. Health workers were also 
required and a campaign was carried out which proved to be very successful, although 
due to a lack of equipment, many of the staff were infected. Testing was quickly 
implemented and a technology involving Bluetooth was developed to track possible 
infected people. 
The main economic measure applied was an aid package worth 940 million euros, which 
was used to buy medical equipment and to provide subsidies to reactivate the economy, 
and subsidies for workers who were unable to work were also approved. 
The management of the pandemic was very effective. With respect to the inter-monthly 
GDP growth rate, the trend of all the countries of the Eurozone is repeated, with a small 
exception, the first four-month period shows a more severe decrease than the rest of the 
countries analysed previously, due to the fact that in the last four-month period of 2019 
there was a growth of +4.3%, the decrease in the first four-month period of 2020 is due 
to arithmetical reasons. 
With regard to employment, perhaps the macroeconomic variable that has been most 
affected, the unemployment rate reached 
levels of 6.8%, a figure reached in 2017. 
Another noteworthy fact is the increase in 
public spending, which represented 28.8% of 
GDP in 2020, compared to 24.6% the previous 
year. 
The German state is the greatest exponent of anticipation of the virus, and despite the 
fact that within its borders the virus manifested itself much earlier than in other European 
countries, it was a benchmark nation in the management of the pandemic. 
On the government's part, it was very important to stockpile health material even before 
the virus was detected in its own country, and expert councils were convened to establish 
measures for action and to gain a better understanding of how the virus worked. Not only 
did the government act consistently with the situation, but the citizens were also civic-
minded, as there was no mandatory quarantine as in other countries, and the inhabitants 
themselves took to the streets on their own initiative only for activities of primary 
necessity and importance. As early as March, restrictive measures in line with European 
Source: Own elaboration. Data: CSOI 
Table 4: Quarter-on-quarter change in GDP of Ireland 




standards were already in evidence, with mass events being avoided and the wearing of 
masks being enforced, but gatherings of a few people were never banned. 
In the field of health care, Germany is the European country with the most intensive care 
beds per inhabitant, with 33 beds per 100,000 inhabitants (Spain has 9 per 100,000). On 
the other hand, the stockpiling of medical supplies and the incidence of the virus in the 
youngest inhabitants meant that the mortality rate was the lowest in Europe, at 0.04%. 
Nevertheless, one of the most criticized and improvable aspects of this strategy was the 
neglect of the situation in nursing homes (Horn, 2020). Due to the increase in cases, 
some governments banned visits to nursing homes, but the incidence of cases and 
deaths (due to the high mortality rates at those ages) were not reduced. To improve this 
aspect, more routine tests should have been carried out on workers and they should 
have been provided with preventive material to reduce contagion in nursing homes. 
On the economic front, the Merkel government offered wage subsidies of up to 60% for 
workers who were forced to reduce their hours, postponed company payments, offered 
bonuses to health workers, and provided numerous loans and grants to companies to 
keep them in business. 
The economic impact was noticeably smaller than in the other countries analysed, the 
month-on-month variation was much less volatile, reflecting the strength of the German 
economy. The seasonally adjusted unemployment 
rate did not change much either, standing at 3.4% 
at the beginning of 2020 and 4.2% at the end of 
the first wave. At the same time, as in the other 
countries, public debt is considerably 
hypertrophied, standing at 59.7% in 2019 and 
reaching values close to 70% of GDP in 2021. 
 
In conclusion, it is important to mention that no country had a health system prepared for 
the magnitude of this crisis; no hospital infrastructure was able to cope with the number 
of infected people in their country. However, the government's political measures and 
the foresight of the events were decisive in controlling the curve of contagion and not 
saturating the hospitals, as well as keeping the situation under control so that the 
standstill of activity would be as short as possible, in this way the data significantly reflect 
the right performance (or not) of the central governments. 
Source: Own elaboration. Data: Federal Statistical Office 
Table 5: Quarter-on-quarter change in GDP of Germany 




To discern whether one strategy is more effective than another, we can analyse the 
health and economic impact of the pandemic: 
On the health level we find that the 3 countries with the highest incidence of cases in the 
first wave of the pandemic are Spain, Sweden and Ireland, and coincidentally each 
country represents each strategy mentioned above. However, the countries with the 
highest incidence of deaths were Spain, UK, and Italy by a wide margin. These countries 
imposed strong restrictions or in the case of Sweden advocated the herd effect. On the 
other hand, the countries that anticipated the pandemic had a relatively low number of 
deaths, above all Germany, the benchmark for all European countries in the 
management of the pandemic. From these data, we can infer that all countries, 
regardless of the strategy implemented, suffered from a high incidence of contagion, but 
perhaps the collection of material and awareness-raising among the population was 
decisive in avoiding health collapses and saving many more lives. 
 
The economic impact of each strategy can be analysed by comparing the variation in the 
year-on-year rate of GDP, where clearly the countries that did not anticipate the 
pandemic were severely affected. The only country that did not anticipate the pandemic 
and did not suffer such severe effects 
was Sweden, which matches the 
numbers for Germany and Ireland. Here 
we can see two clearly differentiated 
groups, those countries whose 
economies were paralysed for less time 
and which had a strong and adaptable 
economy to this new challenge and 
Source: Own elaboration. Data: World Bank 
Figure 21: Year-on-year change in GDP of the countries 
analyzed. 
Figure 20: Cumulative COVID-19 deaths per million people in 
first wave 
Source: Own elaboration. Data: Our World in Data 
Figure 19: Cumulative COVID-19 cases per million people in first 
wave 
Source: Own elaboration. Data: Our World in Data 




those that lacked these characteristics, with an economy dependent on health setbacks 
and with a more static productive fabric that was poorly prepared for the new 
restructuring of the market. 
We could infer at a superficial and intuitive level that the best package of policies would 
be those of the pandemic anticipation strategy, due to their much more favourable figures 
than the rest of the countries analysed.  
Our conclusion lacks consistency due to the fact that many variables are not found in the 
observation, to obtain more conclusive inferences on this issue we should take into 
account in each country its health statistics, economic capacity of the society, 
characteristics of the society, and demographic distribution. (Viktor, Zoran, Petar, 
Dragan, & Ljupco, 2020) 
 
Conclusions and own contributions 
The pandemic has been a turning point in the global economy and Spain has 
experienced it with particular virulence. 
National production has suffered from unparalleled volatility, where the sharp decline in 
GDP in the first half of the year was offset by the recovery and resilience of the second 
half, thus showing an asymmetrical V, in which a partial recovery has already taken place 
and in which a restructuring of the productive fabric is currently underway. This pandemic 
was very asymmetrical with respect to the productive sectors, causing the primary sector 
to gain importance in the economy and the second and tertiary sectors to be severely 
affected in terms of production, especially the tertiary sector, which is of vital importance 
in the Spanish economy. There were also heterogeneous variations in prices: energy 
products suffered from deflation, while services and food products suffered from 
moderate and acute inflation respectively. On the other hand, employment was severely 
depleted in the private sector, especially in the tertiary sector, but public sector jobs grew, 
thus increasing the statehood of our productive model. International trade figures were 
similar to those of the belligerent era, with both exports and imports falling by 
approximately 30%. In year-on-year terms, public debt grew by 20% at the end of 2020 
and in the first quarter of 2021 it has reached a level of 125% of GDP due to the immense 
public spending that was carried out in the pandemic to help families and companies. 
The projections for these indicators are too variable and are structured in 3 different 
scenarios, which depend on the optimism or pessimism of certain economic and health 
variables. Depending on the scenario envisaged, GDP is expected to recover between 




2022 and later in 2025, the unemployment rate is expected to recover between 2021 and 
later in 2023 and, on the other hand, both public debt and CPI are expected to continue 
to grow in the coming years (to a lesser or greater extent depending on the scenario). 
With respect to the comparative analysis carried out, several superficial inferences can 
be made in which we can affirm, firstly, that the strategies of imposing severe restrictive 
measures and advocating individual freedom and the herd effect do not differ much in 
their results. In the strategy that opts for not imposing severe restrictions there is a 
smaller reduction in GDP in the first instance, but the number of people infected in the 
following months makes the pandemic last longer than in countries where restrictive 
measures are imposed from the beginning. Secondly, we can say that countries that 
anticipated the pandemic and prepared for it in advance did better in both health and 
economic terms than the other countries analyzed. We can infer that the stockpiling of 
sanitary material, premature restrictive measures, correct information to the population, 
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